Chief Audit Executive as Supervisory Board Member and Executive Compensation Contracts

This paper studies a unique phenomenon in China's corporate governance—that chief audit executives (CAEs) sit on supervisory boards (CAE duality)—and examines its effects on executive compensation contracts. Using a sample of listed firms between 2010 and 2018, we find a significant positive relation between CAE duality and pay-for-performance sensitivity, which suggests that the dual position helps integrate monitoring resources and reduces agency costs. This positive relation is more pronounced when companies face a stricter monitoring environment and in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in SOEs. In addition, we find that the recent reforms on compensation strengthen the role of CAE duality in SOEs. Further analysis identifies the reliability of performance information (i.e., earnings quality) and reduced executive self-interested behaviours (i.e., perquisite consumption) as the influencing mechanisms that increase the demand for performance-based compensation and thus improve pay-for-performance sensitivity.     

组织信息化环境下知识流动对组织创造力的影响

通过解析知识流动和组织信息化环境的内部构成，探究知识溢出/知识扩散、高管支持/ICT应用对组织创造力的差异性影响，以及不同组织信息化环境对知识流动与组织创造力关系的调节作用。利用信息化程度较高的企业数据，使用层级回归分析进行实证检验。结果表明：组织创造力受知识流动的正向影响，知识扩散对其的正向影响更强；组织信息化正向影响组织创造力，相比ICT应用，高管支持对组织创造力的正向影响更强；高管支持在知识溢出/知识扩散与组织创造力之间的正向调节作用显著；ICT应用对知识扩散与组织创造力的强化作用显著强于对知识溢出与组织创造力之间的调节作用。     

高管薪酬、董事会治理与分类转移

本文研究了高管薪酬和董事会治理对分类转移的影响。研究表明,货币薪酬会诱使高管向上转移利得,股权激励和缺乏区分度的薪酬制度会诱使高管同时向下转移费用和向上转移利得;而勤勉、独立和两职分离的董事会能够在一定程度上识别并抑制这两种不同方式的分类转移;但董事会对分类转移的抑制程度小于高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发程度。进一步地,良好的市场、法制和媒体监督环境能够有效缓解高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发作用,而董事会能够有效弥补法制建设和媒体监督不足导致的分类转移治理缺陷,并在较高质量的审计环境下对分类转移发挥更强的抑制作用。本文首次结合制度背景和媒体监督研究了公司核心治理机制对不同分类转移方式的影响和原因,并创新性地对向上转移利得的程度进行了衡量,为监管部门及公司治理机制、会计准则的制定者提供经验证据。     

Excessive managerial entrenchment,corporate governance,and firm performance

This paper investigates the differential impact of positive and negative excessive managerial entrenchment on the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, CEO compensation, and firm performance. We measure the degree of managerial entrenchment using the E-index introduced by Bebchuk et al. (2009). Our findings suggest that an increase in excess CEO entrenchment reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover due to poor performance. We also show a positive association between excessive entrenchment and CEO compensation as managers gain more power and authority when they are entrenched. On the other hand, excess CEO entrenchment has an inverse correlation with firm performance and firm value. Overall, we propose that excessive managerial entrenchment has a converse impact on board monitoring and shareholders’ welfare.     

CEO regulatory focus and myopic marketing management

This study details the mechanisms on how CEO regulatory focus affects the salience of the gains versus losses involved in myopic marketing decision-making, and how such CEO psychological attributes interact with internal equity-based compensation, external pressure from equity analysts, and environmental turbulence to affect firms’ myopic marketing management propensities. We find that when faced with short-term earnings pressure to meet earnings expectations and when time is no longer a resource, predominantly promotion-focused are more likely to engage in myopic marketing management to benefit from the temporary stock price increase, which comes from meeting or beating earnings expectations. Conversely, predominantly prevention-focused CEOs are less prone to such short-termist actions which results in long-term value loss. For the moderating variables, we find that: (1) equity-based compensation tends to attenuate myopic marketing tendencies of promotion-focused CEOs but have no impact on prevention-focused CEOs, (2) whether equity analysts improve monitoring or aggravate short-term earnings pressure depends on the CEO’s regulatory focus, and (3) environmental turbulence does not increase the myopic marketing management tendencies of predominantly promotion-focused CEOs but rather intensifies the relunctance of prevention-focused CEOs to take short-termist actions. We further find that myopic marketing management mediates the impact of CEO regulatory focus on future firm performance. These findings have important implications for firms and boards when selecting new CEOs and structuring the compensation of existing CEOs. Firms need to simultaneously consider the fit between the CEOs’ regulatory focus, firms’ needs, the business environment, as well as CEO compensation structure.     

高管学术经历能提高企业分红吗？

文章选取2008-2017年沪深A股3449上市公司的23193个样本数据，实证检验了高管学术经历与企业分红水平的关系。研究发现，相比于高管无学术经历的企业，有学术经历高管企业的分红水平显著更高。高管的学术经历通过缓解融资约束，而不是缓解过度投资的路径显著提高企业分红水平。在进一步的研究中，通过引入外部治理与企业产权性质影响因素，发现外部治理较弱、非国有企业的情况下，高管的学术经历对企业分红水平的提高作用更加明显。采用倾向得分匹配法（PSM）、工具变量回归等检验结果依然稳健。研究丰富了高层梯队理论与企业分红相关性的文献，发现了中国情境下影响企业分红的新因素。     

农民宅基地退出差异性受偿意愿及其影响因素分析

研究目的:宅基地退出工作能否顺利推进与退地补偿息息相关,研究宅基地退出中农民差异性受偿意愿及其影响因素,以服务决策。研究方法:基于重庆市890份农民实地调查数据,应用多元离散选择模型(Logit)进行定量研究。研究结果:(1)传统农区的农民更愿意选择货币补偿;城乡结合部(街道办)的农民更愿意选择安置补偿;农民修建补偿选择率总体偏低,区位差异并不明显;(2)农民货币受偿意愿影响因素主要包括受教育程度、家庭主要成员是否定居城镇、非农务工收入、新居住地适应性;(3)农民安置受偿意愿影响因素主要包括年龄、农房是否自住、退地补偿是否有截留、村基础设施状况;(4)农民修建受偿意愿影响因素主要包括农房造价、农房是否新建、退地补偿是否有截留;(5)影响农民受偿意愿的因素存在较大差异,同一因素可能对农民选择受偿意愿产生不同的影响,但没有一个自变量同时对三个因变量产生显著影响。研究结论:应针对农民受偿意愿差异及其影响因素,实行产异化的补偿措施,在经济发展相对滞后的传统地区,强化村落基础设施建设的同时,加大现金补偿力度。对于经济较为发达、区位条件较好的城乡结合部地区,应加大安置补偿力度,以保障退地农民的居住权。     

区域耕地生态价值补偿量化研究——以新疆为例

[目的]在耕地保护形势日趋严峻的情形下,开展耕地生态价值补偿量化研究对了解耕地外部性价值的大小及深化耕地生态价值的量化方法和思路具有重要意义。[方法]文章以新疆为例,从14个地州市的耕地生态服务价值出发,将生态超载指数作为耕地生态服务价值与生态足迹在各地州市转移的测度,同时综合考虑各地州市的经济发展状况,通过构建市域生态价值补偿量化模型分别测算各地州市耕地生态价值补偿量。[结果](1)2015年新疆耕地生态服务价值整体上有盈余输出,全疆共可获得生态补偿费103.31亿元;(2)2015年新疆南北疆耕地生态服务价值比为1:1.7,生态足迹总量比为1:2.2,生态超载指数北亏南盈,表明南北疆耕地生态足迹和耕地生态服务价值间呈"空间异位"格局;(3)新疆北疆乌鲁木齐市、克拉玛依市、吐鲁番市及哈密市共需支付耕地生态补偿费55.67亿元,北疆(乌鲁木齐市、克拉玛依市、吐鲁番市及哈密市外)和南疆地区分别可获得生态补偿费为96.59亿元和62.39亿元。[结论]该文可为新疆各地州市构建耕地生态价值补偿路径提供新思路,也可为以耕地生态价值量确定耕地保护指标和构建耕地生态补偿机制提供参考。     

江苏省农田保护经济补偿政策绩效评价与空间差异研究

［目的］分析评价江苏省现有农田保护经济补偿政策绩效与空间差异对建立完善长效的农业生态补偿机制和推动我国农业生态环境的可持续发展具有重要意义。［方法］以江苏省为研究区域，运用熵权-TOPSIS法，选取2010—2017年全省及苏北、苏中、苏南三个区域内11个指标，计算江苏省及三大区域农田保护经济补偿政策综合绩效值与经济、生态和社会效益单项绩效值，进行比较分析。［结果］（1）江苏省农田保护经济补偿政策在2010—2017年8年综合绩效值由0189波动增长到0841，效果初现且具有较强推广价值。（2）经济效益绩效值以年均257%的增长率由0增长到1，效果最为显著，社会效益次之，生态效益自2013年后为绩效值中最低值，与前两项最大差距在05左右，反映出环境改善、农田质量提高效应远低于农户创收、社会公平效应，政策拟合度不高。（3）江苏省农田保护经济补偿政策效果存在空间差异，综合来看政策效果表现为苏南>苏中>苏北，苏南凭借经济优势在2016年和2017年的综合绩效值上比苏中苏北高出01、在经济与社会绩效值以002的差距领先且生态绩效值没有下降拐点，具有长效可持续性。［结论］现阶段农田保护经济补偿政策效果依赖地方政府经济实力，尚未形成良性长效机制，需从制度体系、环境经济手段、差别化补偿措施、农业补贴结构和宣传等5方面着手，推进农田保护经济补偿政策更好地服务生态环境。